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ARTICLE
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE
KAVITA MARFATIA BERGER, PHD*
Unlike other weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons—
whether developed by a state-sponsored program, terrorist organization, or
lone actor—pose a very unique threat. The knowledge, tools, and tech-
niques used to create biological weapons, as well as the biological agents
themselves, are readily available in research laboratories throughout the
world and in nature. Nearly all biological research is done for peaceful and
legitimate purposes, and all biological agents, with the exception of small-
pox, are public health threats somewhere in the world. Therefore, it is vi-
tally important to emphasize from the outset that biological research and the
knowledge, tools, and techniques gleaned from this research are essential to
improving the human condition, environment, and agriculture. Any attempt
to prevent the development of biological weapons and access to dangerous
biological agents must take into account the benefits of biological research
and be implemented with the full aid and consent of the global biological
sciences community. Only then will we be able to achieve the balance be-
tween promoting beneficial biological research while successfully prevent-
ing the development of and effectively responding to biological weapon
attacks. This paper will describe the legal and ethical framework for the role
of science and scientists in preparedness and response—preventing unau-
thorized access to dangerous biological agents and misuse of knowledge,
tools, and techniques to develop biological weapons—and the impact these
have in responding to a biological attack. As the discussion below will
demonstrate, science and scientific methods are critical components to all
aspects of preparedness and response efforts against infectious disease
threats, regardless of the outbreak’s source (i.e., natural, accidental, or
intentional).
* The author has a BS in Molecular Genetics from The Ohio State University and a PhD in
Genetics and Molecular Biology from Emory University. The author conducted her post-doctoral
research in HIV and smallpox vaccine development at the Emory Vaccine Research Center.
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I. PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE
Response to a bioterrorism incident involves many individuals from
first responders and law enforcement personnel to public health profession-
als. In an overt incident, public health officials and law enforcement person-
nel work together to help mitigate the outbreak and identify the perpetrator.
The more likely incident is a covert event where and agent is released,
which can be done in a number of ways—not just via aerosol means.
Though not first responders, health care professionals and public health of-
ficials are the first to collect patient samples, diagnose the disease, and treat
the sick. If they deem the incident to be an intentional attack with a suspi-
cious agent, route of exposure, or spread of the disease, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would inform law enforcement, in-
cluding the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The function of science during a routine public health response, re-
gardless of whether the exposure is intentional, accidental, or natural, is
focused on performing diagnostic tests to accurately identify the causative
agent of the outbreak and monitor the disease spread, and developing or
manufacturing large amounts of vaccines or therapeutics to control the out-
break. Scientists funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) Regional Centers of Excellence (RCE) are required by contract
to help in detection and surveillance should the CDC become overwhelmed
in an emergency.1 Initial detection of the agent is not just restricted to hos-
pital and public-health pathology laboratories but extends to domestic
animal and wildlife disease surveillance since most dangerous pathogens,
and many of our priority threat agents, are zoonotic, which means they can
infect both animals and humans.2 In the United States’ recent history, sev-
eral examples demonstrate the importance of accurately identifying the
causative agent and mounting an appropriate and rapid public health
response.
In 1999, seven Americans died and several more became ill in New
York City from a virus misdiagnosed as St. Louis Encephalitis Virus, which
is found in North America.3 Just two weeks earlier, veterinarians at the
1. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, HHS Announces New Re-
gional Centers for Biodefense Research (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/new-
sreleases/2003/hhs_rce.htm.
2. See generally Anthony S. Fauci, Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Clear and Present
Danger to Humanity, 292 JAMA 1887 (2004); Anthony S. Fauci, New and Reemerging Diseases:
The Importance of Biomedical Research, 4 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 374 (1998) (discuss-
ing contributions of basic scientific research).
3. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Outbreak
of West Nile-Like Viral Encephalitis—New York, 1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 845, 846 (1999); Robert G. McLean et al., West Nile Virus Transmission and Ecology in
Birds, 951 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 54, 54–55 (2001); See CDC: West Nile Virus Statistics,
Surveillance, and Control at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/
surv&controlCaseCount99_detailed.htm.
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Bronx Zoo observed zoo animals dying, and through post-mortem clinical
tests, identified the causative agent as West Nile Virus.4 During the late
1990s, medical professionals and veterinary professionals did not readily
work together, and information sharing about disease outbreaks between the
human and animal health fields was essentially non-existent. Though some
in the microbiology community had been advocating the One Health/One
Medicine concept, it did not become well known until very recently.5 The
One Health/One Medicine concept states that human, animal, and plant
health are intimately tied to one another and improving the health of plants
and/or animals can help improve the health of humans. It was not until
several weeks after the initial outbreak of West Nile Virus in the United
States that the veterinarians at the Bronx Zoo were able to share their data
with the New York City Department of Health. This sharing of clinical data
corrected the misdiagnosis of St. Louis Encephalitis Virus as the causative
agent of the human outbreak; the pathologies between infected humans and
animals were strikingly similar, and St. Louis Encephalitis Virus is not
known to be zoonotic but West Nile Virus is. In recent years, public health
and intelligence agencies have made progress in integrating animal and
human disease surveillance data to better inform their activities. The West
Nile Virus incident demonstrated that animals show disease symptoms
before humans when infected with a zoonotic agent; animals can therefore
serve as sentinel surveillance to a potential human outbreak.6 This can also
be true for a bioterrorism incident, where the fitness of animals can help
warn the human population of a potential outbreak or aerosol release of a
dangerous zoonotic agent. For example, rats and other small rodents would
become ill before humans if plague were released via aerosol in an urban
environment. This is due to natural responses against the pathogen and size
of the host—small rodent versus human.  In 2007, the CDC established the
National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, which
staffs at least sixty veterinarians, to provide the CDC with expertise for
epidemiological studies, bioterrorism preparedness, applied research, dis-
ease surveillance, and outbreak response.7 The U.S. Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) Office of Health Affairs and the National Bio-
surveillance Integration Center have also employed veterinarians as experts
for bioterrorism preparedness and infectious disease surveillance.
4. George V. Ludwig et al., An Outbreak of West Nile Virus in a New York City Captive
Wildlife Population, AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 67(1), 67 (2002).
5. See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, ONE HEALTH: A NEW PROFESSIONAL IMPERATIVE 3
(2008), http://www.avma.org/onehealth/onehealth_final.pdf.
6. Diane M. Gubernot et al., Animals as Early Detectors of Bioevents: Veterinary Tools and
a Framework for Animal-Human Integrated Zoonotic Disease Surveillance, 123 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 301, 301 (2000).
7. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne,
and Enteric Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2009).
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The ability to properly respond to an unusual outbreak depends on
recognizing the symptoms of a disease, being aware of the possible agents
that might cause the symptoms, and conducting the appropriate diagnostic
tests to identify and confirm the causative agent. Critical for all of these
missions, regardless of job function (i.e., first responder, public health
laboratorian, or health professional), is training. The first case from the
2001 anthrax attack was detected in Florida by a physician who had just
returned from a bioterrorism training program at the CDC.8 He accurately
diagnosed the infection to be caused by anthrax and requested confirmatory
tests from the hospital, state public health laboratories, and the CDC. Once
confirmed, exposed individuals were given ciprofloxin, and surveillance
and decontamination efforts began. Considering they had not encountered
an inhalational anthrax in twenty-five years, the CDC and Florida physician
took the appropriate actions to rapidly confirm and mitigate the outbreak.
Subsequent exposures in New York City, where health officials had not
received recent bioterrorism training, followed a different path.9 News
anchor Tom Brokaw has been outspoken about his failed attempts to iden-
tify the agent that caused his assistant’s illness.10 He states that he repeat-
edly consulted with experts at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) without receiving an accu-
rate diagnosis. The causative agent of the New York City infections was not
confirmed until the overt attack on the Senate Hart Building in October
2001. The result was the recognition that training health care professionals
and public health officials on bioterrorism preparedness and response is
critical to initially diagnosing the cause of the outbreak. Other very impor-
tant lessons learned from the anthrax mailings were that public health offi-
cials and law enforcement must develop common protocols for handling
samples and communicating with one another during an outbreak of un-
known or unfamiliar origin, and that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) must develop plans for decontaminating affected infrastructure and
conduct risk analyses to determine what constitutes the level of residual
agent below which the public and surrounding environment is not at risk of
infection.11
More recently, an individual from Atlanta, Andrew Speaker, con-
tracted tuberculosis and refused treatment through his local public health
8. Daniel B. Jernigan et al., Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States,
2001: Epidemiologic Findings, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1019 (2002); Marc S. Traeger
et al., First Case of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax in the United States, Palm Beach
County, Florida, 2001, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1029 (2002).
9. See generally Timothy H. Holtz et al., Isolated Case of Bioterrorism-Related Inhala-
tional Anthrax, New York City, 2001, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 689 (2003).
10. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM,
WORLD AT RISK 7 (2008).
11. Dorothy A. Canter, Addressing Residual Risk Issues at Anthrax Cleanups: How Clean is
Safe?, 68 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH, PART A 1017 (2005).
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department.12 As the CDC was confirming the strain of tuberculosis, it
warned Mr. Speaker not to go on his upcoming honeymoon to Europe. Mr.
Speaker moved the date of his travel up and left for his honeymoon before
the CDC could contain him. The CDC’s tests diagnosed him as having ex-
tremely drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), which is very dangerous
since no commonly prescribed antibiotic is effective against it. Just a few
weeks before this incident, the revised International Health Regulations
(IHR2005) entered into force. The IHR2005 is a binding international
agreement aimed at controlling public health outbreaks of international con-
cern.13 Mr. Speaker, with XDR-TB, fell into such a category. Although the
U.S. CDC informed the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Con-
trol and a few European governments, officials were unable to stop him
from traveling all over Europe before returning home via a land port be-
tween Canada and the United States. Despite being on the CDC alert list,
the Customs and Border Patrol Officer let him into the country. The CDC
took Mr. Speaker to Colorado for isolation, where tests later confirmed that
he did not have XDR-TB but was infected with multi-drug resistant tuber-
culosis. Health officials treated him and sent him home. This case demon-
strates the inability of the public health system to work quickly and
accurately to identify the exact strain of the infectious agent, which is criti-
cal to assessing the appropriate response from the public health system and
international community.
Development of medical countermeasures against unknown or known
biological agents (except for those with vaccines or therapeutics in the Stra-
tegic National Stockpile) is an important role for scientists during response
to a natural or intentional biological outbreak. Development of vaccines and
therapeutics to control and mitigate the outbreak depends on current tech-
nologies and scientific advancement in vaccine and drug development as
well as the transmission rates and infectivity of the infectious agent. Influ-
enza, for example, is easily transmitted via aerosol routes between people.14
The threat of the pre-pandemic H5N1 influenza virus becoming a human
pathogen has fueled the U.S. government to consider plans for rapid identi-
fication of the pandemic strain and development of vaccines against the
pandemic strain.15 Current estimates indicate that development of a vaccine
against the pandemic influenza strain would take three to six months. By
this time, most of the country and world will have been infected with influ-
enza. While development of a SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome)
12. Vikki Valentine, A Timeline of Andrew Speaker’s Infection, June 6, 2007, http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/tb.
13. World Health Organization: What Are the International Health Regulations? (Apr. 10,
2008), http://www.who.int/features/qa/39/en/index.html.
14. See Raymond Tellier, Review of Aerosol Transmission of Influenza A Virus, 12 EMERG-
ING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1657 (2006).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 5 (2005),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf.
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vaccine was rapid (nine months), development of vaccines against other
priority threat agents may be more difficult. HHS is currently supporting (in
principle, if not funding) broad-spectrum medical countermeasures and new
technologies that allow for rapid development and manufacturing of effec-
tive vaccines.16
The manufacturer of vaccines against the pre-pandemic H5N1 influ-
enza is Sanofi-Pasteur. Sanofi-Pasteur, like most large pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies, is multinational, and many of the facilities are in
developed nations. During a pandemic, many nations, including the United
States, could try to claim the vaccines manufactured in their country for
their own citizens. Indonesia, which is the only country to have had limited
person-to-person transmission of the pre-pandemic H5N1 influenza virus,
has blocked sharing of viral isolates and information with developed na-
tions because of intellectual property and technology transfer concerns.17
The Indonesian government is mostly concerned that vaccines and thera-
peutics developed from the strains initially isolated in Indonesia will not be
shared with them. Until recently, pharmaceutical companies did not donate
doses of vaccine for use in developing countries like Indonesia. In early
2009, however, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation successfully negoti-
ated with the pharmaceutical industry to donate 110,000 doses of H5N1
influenza vaccine to the World Health Organization (WHO) for use in de-
veloping nations.18 The 2009 H1N1 pandemic prompted two multi-national
companies—Glaxo Smith Kline and Sanofi-Pasteur—to donate H1N1 vac-
cine to the WHO for developing nations.19 Beyond these real intellectual
property concerns and concerns about access to medical interventions, Indo-
nesia has recently moved beyond intellectual property concerns to security
concerns. Indonesia has claimed that the United States’ security policies
prevent sharing of information about the H5N1 strains that were originally
isolated in Indonesia and unfoundedly claimed that the United States is us-
ing their influenza strains to make biological weapons.20 There is a growing
concern that other developing nations may follow Indonesia’s lead. It is
16. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Services, HHS PHEMCE Strategy and HHS PHEMCE
Implementation Plan, http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/phemce/enterprise/strategy/index.html (last
visited Aug. 23, 2009).
17. Martin Enserink & Dennis Normile, More Bumps on the Road to Global Sharing of
H5N1 Samples, 318 SCI. 1229, 1229 (2007); David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, Interna-
tional Law, and Global Health Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88 (2008).
18. Katherine Nightingale & T.V. Padma, Poor May Lose Out in Swine Flu Vaccine Produc-
tion (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.scidev.net/fr/south-east-asia/news/les-pauvres-grands-perdants-
de-la-production-d-un-.html.
19. Sanofi-Aventis, GlaxoSmithKline Will Donate Influenza Vaccines to WHO, KAISER
DAILY GLOBAL HEALTH POL’Y REP. (Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Menlo Park, Cal.), June 18,
2009, http://globalhealth.kff.org/Daily-Reports/2009/June/18/GH-061809-Swine-Flu-
Update.aspx.
20. Agence France-Presse, Indonesia’s Bird Flu Warrior Takes on the World (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hZwVUAJGlcX8VNojn0MB98vQb8Gg.
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vitally important to promote international collaboration and coordination
among academic, government, and industry scientists and public health of-
ficials to ensure that the proper vaccines are being made and delivered to all
who need them, and not just those who can afford them.
II. THE SELECT AGENT PROGRAM AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES
The development and use of vaccines against infectious diseases com-
monly afflicting children—childhood diseases—and the successful global
eradication of smallpox in 1977 made many in the scientific community
consider the fight against infectious diseases an easily attainable en-
deavor.21 Then, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), unidentified at the
time, became more prevalent. Although HIV initially entered the human
population during the 1950s,22 its effects in western countries were not seen
to great degrees until the 1980s.23 During the subsequent decades, scientists
identified more infectious agents and recognized that infectious diseases
were everywhere and would continually plague the human race.24
We now know that many infectious diseases exist—most are newly-
emerging or re-emerging within the population. More than 75 percent of
infectious diseases are zoonotic, which means they can infect both animals
and humans.25 Many of the newly emerging pathogens are zoonotic and
have existed in animal hosts for decades or centuries before they emerge in
the human population. For example, the natural hosts for HIV are new
world monkeys; for Ebola virus, great apes; for plague, rodents; and, for
influenza, birds and pigs.26 In fact, an overwhelming majority of the United
States’ priority national security threat agents are naturally-occurring zoo-
notic agents. Smallpox (human only) and foot-and-mouth disease (hoofed
animals only) are among the few that are not zoonotic.
In 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian Prime Minister
Boris Yeltsen admitted that the former Soviet Union had an enormous bio-
21. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Services., Recom-
mendations of the International Task Force for Disease Eradication, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WEEKLY REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 1 (1993).
22. Beatrice H. Hahn et al., AIDS as a Zoonosis: Scientific and Public Health Implications,
287 SCI. 607 (2000).
23. Jonathan W.M. Gold et al., Unexplained Persistent Lymphadenopathy in Homosexual
Men and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 64 MED. (BALT.) 203 (1985).
24. Fauci, Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Clear and Present Danger to Humanity, supra
note 2, at 1887; see also Fauci, New and Reemerging Diseases: The Importance of Biomedical
Research, supra note 2, at 374 (discussing diseases that have emerged since 1918)
25. Mark E.J. Woolhouse & Sonya Gowtage-Sequeria, Host Range and Emerging and
Reemerging Pathogens, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1842, 1842–47 (2005).
26. A.B. Christie, Plague: Review of Ecology, 1 ECOLOGY OF DISEASE 111, 114 (1982); Eric
M. Leroy et al., Multiple Ebola Virus Transmission Events and Rapid Decline of Central African
Wildlife, 303 SCI. 387, 387–90 (2004); Paul M. Sharp et al., Cross-Species Transmission and
Recombination of ‘AIDS’ Viruses, 349 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 41, 41–47 (1995);
R.G. Webster et al., Influenza Viruses: Transmission Between Species, 288 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 439, 439–47 (1980).
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logical weapons program.27 The concern over bioterrorism first began dur-
ing the mid-1990s when the Japanese group, Aum Shinrikyo, who
successfully released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway station, attempted to
weaponize and disseminate anthrax.28 Much to the group’s dismay, the
strain of anthrax it was using was the stern strain—an animal vaccine
strain—but the group was supposedly successful at aerosolizing the bacteria
and managed to release the aerosolized vaccine on top of a Tokyo building.
In addition to anthrax, Aum Shinrikyo reportedly tried to acquire Ebola
virus from a village in Africa during an outbreak but failed. Although the
group invested millions of dollars to acquire dangerous pathogens or create
biological weapons, it was unsuccessful.29
Shortly after the revelations of Aum Shinrikyo, an American microbi-
ologist and member of the Aryan Nations, Larry Wayne Harris, acquired
the plague bacteria from the American Type Culture Collection under false
pretenses.30 He was convicted of mail fraud, since unauthorized possession
of dangerous pathogens was not illegal.31 This incident spurred fears that
anyone could get dangerous pathogens; the pathogens of greatest concern
were those known to be weaponized by the Soviet Union. The result was
the creation of the Select Agent Program under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996.32 This statute restricts the transfer of a
select set of dangerous biological agents. Following the 2001 anthrax mail-
ings, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act and the Public Health Secur-
ity and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which
expanded the Select Agent Programs to include background checks by the
Department of Justice for anyone seeking to work with select agents and
registration of individuals and facilities seeking to work with biological
agents on the select agent list.33 The list now includes human, zoonotic
(referred to as “overlap” agents), animal, and plant pathogens and toxins;
the program is jointly run by the CDC Prevention and the USDA Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).
The select agent regulations have disrupted research collaboration
among American and foreign scientists.34 The National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) policies state that laboratories of foreign
27. Richard Stone, Down to the Wire on Bioweapons Talks, 293 SCI. 414, 415 (2001).
28. George W. Christopher et al., Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, in BIOLOGI-
CAL WEAPONS: LIMITING THE THREAT 33 (Joshua Lederberg ed., Belfer Center for Sci. and Int’l
Affiars, 4th prtg. 2001) (1999).
29. William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo’s Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?, 24
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 289, 293 (2001).
30. Jonathan B. Tucker, Bioterrorism: Threats and Responses, in BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
LIMITING THE THREAT, supra note 28, at 309.
31. Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Improving the Select Agent Program, BULL. ATOMIC SCI. (2008).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009).
33. Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009); 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009).
34. JULIE E. FISCHER, STEWARDSHIP OR CENSORSHIP? BALANCING BIOSECURITY, THE PUB-
LIC’S HEALTH, AND THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS 2 (2006).
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collaborators of NIAID-funded investigators have to be at the same safety
and security standards as U.S. laboratories.35 In many nations where select
agents pose serious public health threats, there are not enough resources to
build and maintain laboratory facilities at American standards. Disruption
of international collaborations greatly hampers the United States’ ability to
help identify and respond to public health threats of international concern.36
During the SARS outbreak in 2003, a group of preeminent scientists from
throughout the world requested that SARS be left off of the select agent list
in order to ensure that the best scientists can collaborate to identify, charac-
terize, and develop medical interventions against the disease-causing
agent.37 There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that scientists outside the
United States were initially hesitant to work with American scientists on
SARS because of the security challenges associated with the Select Agent
Program. Importantly, the lack of restrictions on SARS facilitated interna-
tional collaboration among leading public health experts and scientists in
coronavirus biology, resulting in the rapid identification of the novel infec-
tious agent38 and development of an effective vaccine against SARS in nine
months.39 While not all pathogens are like SARS—influenza, for example,
mutates rapidly so developing an effective vaccine from an original pan-
demic strain may be difficult—the exceptional scientific response to the
SARS outbreak demonstrated the powerful role science plays in public
health response.
The SARS experience highlights the need for evaluating the costs of
the Select Agent Program to human, animal, and/or plant health; science;
and other national goals as compared to the program’s actual benefits to
national security. There are currently seventy-two agents on the select agent
list.40 Some agents, like smallpox, hemorrhagic fevers, anthrax, and foot-
and-mouth disease, are primarily on the list because they were previously
weaponized in state-sponsored programs or used in biological warfare.41
All select agents, with the exception of smallpox and the 1918 influenza
35. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, SELECT AGENT TERM FOR
FOREIGN AWARDS, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/selectterm.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2009).
36. In addition to this function, international collaborations build relationships and trust
among scientists from many countries, which contribute to diplomatic efforts and transparency.
37. M. Enserink, Researchers Urge U.S. to Keep SARS Off Select Agent List, 304 SCI. 1726,
1726 (2004).
38. Christian Drosten et al., Identification of a Novel Coronavirus in Patients with Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1967, 1968 (2003).
39. Zhi-yong Yang et al., A DNA Vaccine Induces SARS Coronavirus Neutralization and
Protective Immunity in Mice, 428 NATURE 561, 561 (2004).
40. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, LIST OF SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS,
http://www.selectagents.gov/resources/List%20of%20Select%20Agents%20and%20Toxins_1117
08.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
41. JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS: POSSESSION AND PROGRAMS PAST AND PRESENT, http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/possess.htm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009); See also SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS LIST, supra note 40.
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virus, are current global human, animal, or plant health problems. DHS has
developed a risk assessment tool that identified twelve material biological
threats to national security.42 All of these biological threats are on the select
agent list. With added concerns about creating pathogens from scratch,
modifying harmless pathogens to be more dangerous, and recreating extinct
pathogens, the security community has advocated modifying the select
agent list to cover those agents. The National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB), a federal advisory committee at the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) tasked to provide the U.S. government recom-
mendations on the criteria, oversight, and education of dual-use life sci-
ences research and synthetic biology, has recommended that the federal
government convene a group of experts to review the select agent classifi-
cation scheme to “reconcile the current controls for Select Agents with the
anticipated scientific advances enabled by synthetic genomics,” and con-
sider an alternative framework that uses predictive properties of genomic
sequences for classifying select agents in lieu of a finite list.43 The NIH has
tasked the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to review the feasibility of
the alternative framework of the select agent list based on predictive proper-
ties of biological agents.44 On February 26, Senators Kennedy and Burr and
Representatives Harmon and Rogers introduced companion bills for the
reauthorization and modification of the select agent program—the Select
Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act (H.R. 1225 and S. 485).
This bill, among other mandated actions, includes language to review the
select agent list for its inclusion of unknown or novel biological agents as
well as a review of the program’s effects on scientific advancement and
international scientific collaboration.45 More recently, on November 4,
2009, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
passed the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act (S.1649).  This bill es-
tablished a tiered system of biological agents with commensurate security
measures; gave the Department of Homeland Security authority to establish
security standards and oversee the security components of laboratories;
gave the Department of State the authority to facilitate consolidation of
“Tier I” agents found in international laboratories to a single laboratory in
each nation; and explicitly described the security topics on which the De-
42. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY BIOTERRORISM RISK AS-
SESSMENT: A CALL FOR CHANGE. 4 (2008).
43. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS
RELATED TO THE SYNTHESIS OF SELECT AGENTS 13 (2006), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/pdf/Final_NSABB_Report_on_Synthetic_Genomics.pdf.
44. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.,  SCIENTIFIC MILESTONES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENE-SE-
QUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSIGHT OF SELECT AGENTS (2009), available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49063.
45. Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act, H.R. 1225, 111th Cong. § 102
(2009).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 11 15-JAN-10 9:41
632 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:3
partment of State should engage the international community.46  Interna-
tional scientific collaboration was critical in the identification of SARS, and
both international collaboration and scientific advancement were crucial for
rapid development of an effective medical intervention against SARS.
On January 6, 2009, President Bush issued an executive order (Execu-
tive Order 13486) to review all U.S. laws and regulations governing select
agents, the criteria for determining which individuals can have access to
select agents (called “personnel reliability”), and the oversight of high-con-
tainment laboratories.47 The charge is to identify gaps or challenges, and to
provide recommendations to address them and improve laboratory biosafety
and security. This review includes an assessment of transportation of select
agents, physical security of facilities housing select agents, and the respon-
sibilities of scientists working with select agents.48 The White House tasked
the NSABB to review personnel reliability programs and issue recommen-
dations on how to develop and conduct a personnel reliability program for
personnel working with or around select agents.49 The NSABB recom-
mended against a formal, national personnel reliability program for select
agent researchers, while supporting enhancement of existing measures and a
culture of responsibility and accountability within institutions conducting
select agent research. The White House also tasked the National Academies
to review personnel reliability; the recommendations were released on Sep-
tember 30, 200950 The interagency review is now complete, and the recom-
mendations are currently under review within U.S. government and have
not been publicly released.
III. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ACTIONS
Assessing the potential threat of biological agents is very complex.
Biological agents exist naturally and in most cases are global health threats
to humans, animals, or plants. The Select Agent Program lists pathogens
that are considered by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and Agriculture (USDA) to be threats to national security regardless
of their impact on global health. The challenge faced by the intelligence and
security communities to assess the risk of biological agents as national se-
curity threats not only depends on the capabilities possessed by suspects but
46. WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act, S. 1649, 111th Cong. (2009)
47. Exec. Order No. 13,486, 74 Fed. Reg. 9 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://edocket.
access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-818.pdf.
48. U.S. GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC CONSULTATION MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
STRENGTHENING THE BIOSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at https://www.medi-
calcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/documents/AGENDA_Biosecurity_WG_Public_Consultation.
pdf.
49. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING PERSONNEL RELIABILITY
AMONG INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO SELECT AGENTS 11 (2009).
50. National Research Council.  Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and
Toxins. National Academies Press (Washington, DC, 2009).
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also the state of the science to create and weaponize a biological agent, the
infectious and pathogenic properties of dangerous agents, and the accessi-
bility of those agents. The fear that synthetic biology techniques could be
used by nefarious actors to create a dangerous or novel pathogen has fueled
much of the concern over advancing biotechnology and the dual-use di-
lemma.51 The dual-use dilemma in the life sciences is defined as legitimate
and beneficial research that could be misapplied for malicious purposes;52
this definition is distinctly different from the traditional use of the term
“dual use,” which describes technologies that have civilian and military
uses.53 The recent report, World at Risk, by the Commission on the Preven-
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD
Commission) states that the bioterrorism risk is equal to or greater than the
nuclear terrorism risk because dangerous biological agents are easily acces-
sible and the threshold for obtaining the needed biotechnologies to create a
dangerous biological agent are sufficiently low that anyone with minimal
scientific background can create a biological weapon.54
Although the priority with which the Obama Administration regards
biodefense is currently unknown, the security community is convinced that
biological terrorism is a real threat. The common belief is that an integrated
prevention and response capability in biosecurity will significantly help re-
duce the likelihood that a bioterrorism incident will occur. Prevention strat-
egies were partially mentioned before with minimizing the likelihood of
misuse of legitimate research—an issue taken up at the 2008 Intersessional
Meeting of the Biological Weapons Convention55—cooperative threat re-
duction programs, and bioengagement programs. Biological cooperative
threat reduction programs have invested in redirecting former Soviet weap-
ons scientists and facilities to peaceful research endeavors.56 The BioIndus-
try Initiative has redirected research and development at weapons facilities
in the former Soviet Union to create needed vaccines and therapeutics to
51. Erika Check, Synthetic Biologists Face Up to Security Issues, 436 NATURE 894, 894
(2005).
52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
18–19 (2004).
53. Ronald M. Atlas & Malcolm Dando, The Dual-Use Dilemma for the Life Sciences: Per-
spectives, Conundrums, and Global Solutions, 4 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 276, 276 (2006).
54. COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND
TERRORISM & BOB GRAHAM, WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVEN-
TION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 11 (2008).
55. Conference of the State Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their De-
struction, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 12 2008, Report of the Meeting of State Parties, ¶ 17.
56. See Opportunities for Reducing Nuclear and Biological Threats at the Source: Hearing
Before the H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Francis Record, Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation); NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL THREATS: CHALLENGES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE’S NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM BEYOND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (2009).
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combat infectious disease outbreaks.57 The Department of State’s Bi-
osecurity Engagement Program has sought to build relationships between
American scientists and foreign scientists on scientific and health related
issues important to the foreign scientists, such as disease surveillance and
biosafety laboratory capacity and training.58 This model of bioengagement,
which started in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Se-
curity and Nonproliferation, is now being adopted by the Department of
Defense (DoD) as a next generation CTR program.59 The DoD program has
begun to engage nations on disease surveillance and other global health
activities.60
With regard to preparedness and response, much of the funding and
focus has been on developing vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostic capabil-
ities to be able to effectively identify and mitigate any outbreak regardless
of origin—intentional, accidental, or natural.61 Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive 10 (HSPD-10): Biodefense for the 21st Century tasks the
DHS to biennially assess biological threats to the United States to help
guide biodefense research and medical countermeasure development
against those priority biological threats.62 The first Bioterrorism Risk As-
sessment (BTRA) was completed in 2006 and a revised assessment was
produced in 2008.63  The first BTRA used computer-based tools to assess
the risk of twenty-seven natural pathogens and one engineered pathogen.
The pathogens were ranked according to “subjective event probabilities”
(e.g. indoor or outdoor aerosol) and the resulting consequences.64 Thirteen
priority threats were identified from the 2006 risk assessment.65 These pri-
ority threats undergo material threat determinations (MTD) “with inputs
from the intelligence, law enforcement, scientific and public health commu-
nities,” and population threat assessments (PTA), which estimates the ex-
posed population to gauge the affected population and infrastructure in a
57. U.S. Department of State, BioIndustry Initiative, http://biistate.net/wp/home/history (last
visited Sept 13, 2009).
58. U.S. Department of State, Biosecurity Engagement Program, http://www.bepstate.net/
index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
59. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT: A NEW MODEL
FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (2009).
60. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 25.
61. Crystal Franco & Shana Deitch, Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense
Funding, FY2007–FY2008, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 117, 120–121 (2007).
62. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: Bi-
odefense for the 21st Century (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/
hspd-10.html.
63. Gregory S. Parnell et al., Scientists Urge DHS to Improve Bioterrorism Risk Assessment,
6 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 353, 354 (2008).
64. Id.
65. Hearing on PL 108-276 Before the S. Comm. on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science & Technology, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Jeffrey Runge, Acting Assistant Secre-
tary for Health Affairs).
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plausible scenario.66 The results of the MTDs and PTAs are shared with the
HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response
(ASPR), who conducts consequence modeling of the material threats and
evaluates whether vaccines, therapeutics, or effective diagnostics exist for
priority threats. These determinations will guide basic research and devel-
opment of medical countermeasures that do not exist for priority threats as
well as funding for procuring existing safe and efficacious medical counter-
measures for use in an emergency.
IV. MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DEVELOPMENT
The 2001 anthrax event, SARS outbreak, and West Nile outbreak
demonstrated the need for increased research on biological agents involved
in an intentional or natural outbreak, and development of effective medical
interventions for those agents. One critical component to bioterrorism
preparedness is development and procurement of vaccines, therapeutics,
and diagnostic tests (collectively termed “medical countermeasures”).  Re-
search and development (R&D) of vaccines and therapeutics is complex.
The average total cost of developing a medical intervention from concept to
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval is approximately $800 mil-
lion to $1 billion per product and takes ten to fifteen years to get through
clinical trials, advanced development, and FDA approval.67 In order to get
one successful product through the R&D pipeline, hundreds to thousands of
vaccine or drug candidates are tested in cell culture, small animal models,
and large animal models using various routes of delivery to get optimal
safety and efficacy results. Much of this basic research is covered by profits
(in the case of private industry) or funding from the federal government or
foundations. Generally, a few promising vaccine or drug candidates emerge
from the basic research and enter pre-clinical and clinical trials where safety
and efficacy of the products in humans is determined. While early stages of
pre-clinical development can be done using NIH funds and in an academic
setting, the majority of research in this phase of R&D is done in collabora-
tion with pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical companies have the
means to manufacture vaccines and drugs for human consumption on a
large scale and under good laboratory and manufacturing practices, to per-
form large-scale clinical trials, and to absorb the costs associated with regis-
tering the product with the FDA (i.e. registering the drug as pre-
investigational new drug and investigational new drug) and with subsequent
FDA approval. Clinical trials assessing safety are typically done by observ-
ing the effects of the candidate product in healthy human populations as
compared to a placebo and an existing product for the same indication (if
66. Id.
67. Jason Matheny et al., Incentives for Biodefense Countermeasure Development, 5 BI-
OSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 228 (2007).
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one is available) in a controlled setting. Trials assessing efficacy are gener-
ally done in a population enriched for the target disease (e.g. testing an HIV
vaccine candidate in a population highly susceptible to HIV infection, like
injection-drug users) and alongside groups receiving placebo or existing
product (if available) using a controlled protocol. All research requires ap-
proval by the Institutional Biosafety Committee, all animal research re-
quires approval by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, and
all clinical trials require institutional review body approval and consent by
trial participants. All of these levels of research are overseen by internal
mechanisms, the FDA, NIH, USDA, and potentially the CDC. As men-
tioned in the section on High-Containment Laboratories, other federal and
state agencies conduct oversight of biological research.
The process just described is typical for most vaccines, therapeutics,
and diagnostic tests. Medical countermeasures against select agents and bi-
odefense priority threat agents, however, are more complex and involve
more risk. Despite many of the priority threat agents being global health
threats, they do not generally affect the United States or developed nations.
This adds to the financial and scientific challenges associated with research
and development of vaccines, drugs, or diagnostic tests against biodefense
agents. The financial risk is greater with medical countermeasures against
priority threat agents because there is no natural market for the vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostic tests beyond the U.S. federal government.68 Al-
though attempts have been made to engage the international community to
sign contracts to procure the medical countermeasures for their own coun-
tries, very few nations have invested in stockpiling medical countermea-
sures.69 The financial risk exacerbates the scientific challenges of
developing medical countermeasures against biodefense agents. The issue
of safety and security of select agent research is a critical challenge, espe-
cially in today’s political climate. With increased funding for research and
countermeasure development against select agents comes an increased
safety need, which includes building high-containment laboratories to pro-
tect laboratory workers and the environment from accidental exposure to
the agents researched in those labs.70 Another major issue is that of testing
the efficacy of promising candidate vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tests to
prevent or control infection with a priority threat agent. These studies typi-
cally involve multiple testing sites enrolling several hundred to thousands
of human subjects suffering from the target indication in a placebo-con-
trolled clinical trial. Natural outbreaks of many of the priority threat agents
are so small and potentially unpredictable that planning for a well-con-
68. Tove C. Bolken & Dennis E. Hruby, Discovery and Development of Antiviral Drugs for
Biodefense: Experience of a Small Biotechnology Company, 77 ANTIVIRAL RES. 1, 3 (2008).
69. Global Health Security Initiative, Ministerial Statement (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.ghsi.
ca/english/statementbrussels2008.asp.
70. See Section V on High-Containment Laboratories for a more detailed discussion.
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trolled study using natural infection is extremely difficult. Since testing the
efficacy of a candidate product by challenging human subjects with the
threat agent is wholly unethical, the use of animal models is critical for
advanced development of these vaccines and therapeutics.71
Developing animal models that mimic human infection is scientifically
difficult and costly. The regulatory framework and standards for developing
these models and subsequent testing of the candidate countermeasures is
relatively unfamiliar and evolving as our medical countermeasure needs
evolve. The DoD has tasked the National Academy of Sciences to review
animal models for testing medical countermeasures against biological threat
agents. Developing diagnostic tests poses distinct challenges to vaccines
and drugs as their efficacy evaluations depend on having appropriate sam-
ples to identify appropriate test materials and minimize non-specific reac-
tions to those materials while enhancing specific reactions against the
biological agent. It is not clear that there have been advances in understand-
ing or developing the appropriate samples to evaluate diagnostic tests
against priority threat agents.
In September 2003, NIAID awarded eight universities to head RCEs to
support investigator-driven biodefense research with an emphasis on devel-
opment of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics;72 as of 2009, NIAID sup-
ports ten RCEs. These RCEs in combination with individual investigators
directly funded by NIAID and small biotechnology firms conduct the basic
research needed to understand the infectivity and pathogenicity of infec-
tious agents and develop medical countermeasures against them. Project Bi-
oShield, enacted in 2004, established a special reserve fund for procurement
of medical countermeasures against U.S. priority threat agents.73 In order to
be procured, these vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics would have to be
within eight years of FDA approval.74 Project BioShield also established
the emergency use authorization so a procured vaccine or therapeutic whose
FDA approval is pending can be used during an emergency.75 Procured
medical countermeasures are stored in the Strategic National Stockpile.
Lawmakers intended for the BioShield program to provide an end market
for safe and effective medical countermeasures against biological agents
rarely found in the United States. Large pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies were not interested in participating in the BioShield program
because the biodefense industry was not profitable enough and the cost of
71. Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., The FDA Animal Efficacy Rule and Biodefense, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1084, 1084 (2007).
72. News Release, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, HHS Announces
New Regional Centers for Biodefense Research (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www3.niaid.
nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2003/hhs_rce.htm.
73. 6 U.S.C.A. § 321j (2006 & Supp. 2009).
74. Matheny et al., supra note 66, at 232.
75. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 17 15-JAN-10 9:41
638 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:3
redirecting existing manufacturing facilities or building new facilities to ac-
commodate the biodefense countermeasure was not cost effective for large
pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies. This left small companies with
little available capital to absorb the cost of R&D of candidate countermea-
sures and whose sole or main product was the BioShield-contracted prod-
uct. To help companies transition between the basic research phase and
procurement phase of medical countermeasure development, the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA)76 established the Bi-
omedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)77 to
fund advanced development (including efficacy testing in animal models)
of promising candidate products before BioShield funds are provided for
procurement. Though BARDA has been able to fund some advanced devel-
opment, the program has not been appropriated more than one-tenth the
authorized amount (authorized at $1.07 billion) per year in fiscal years (FY)
2007 and 2008, limiting the program’s effectiveness.78 In FY2009, BARDA
received $275 million from the Strategic National Stockpile.79 The PAHPA
also added milestone payments to companies developing medical counter-
measures against priority threat agents to help smaller companies recoup
some of their R&D costs before the final procurement and payment. The
PAHPA also created the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB)80 to
evaluate scientific incentives to help bolster development of medical coun-
termeasures against priority threat agents.81 Examples of scientific incen-
tives include platform technologies (a single technology that can be used to
rapidly generate several distinct products) and warm-base manufacturing
(continued support for a low level of product manufacturing after the initial
contracted product has been delivered to the Strategic National Stockpile).
In reality, the NBSB has considered public health responses and financial
incentives for countermeasure development but has not evaluated the scien-
tific incentives. In 2007, President Bush issued HSPD-18: Medical Coun-
termeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction82 and HSPD 21: Public
76. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d–7e (2006).
78. Jason Matheny et al., Cost/Success Projections for U.S. Biodefense Countermeasure De-
velopment, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 981, 981–82 (2008).
79. Bradley T. Smith et al., Developing Medical Countermeasures for Biodefense. 7 BI-
OSECURITY &  BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCIENCE 42, 42 (2009).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-7f (2006); see also U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
National Biodefense Science Board, http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/omsph/nbsb (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-7f–Sec 319M; 42 U.S.C. § 217a–Sec 222.
82. Directive on Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 128–134 (Feb. 12, 2007).
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Health and Medical Preparedness,83 both of which support the develop-
ment of the medical countermeasure enterprise.
Project BioShield has procured vaccines against anthrax and smallpox,
and botulinum toxin antitoxin.84 In addition, there is an active contract for
antivirals against smallpox.  BioShield has also procured the CHEMpak,
which contains anti-nerve agents, and potassium iodide. There has been sig-
nificant criticism of the BioShield program, primarily due to the large
amount of funds appropriated and small list of procured countermeasures.
The BioShield office within the ASPR released the Public Health Emer-
gency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) strategic plan in
2006 laying out short-, mid-, and long-term goals for medical countermea-
sure procurement.85 Although the short-term goals still conform to the “one
bug/one drug” concept,86 the mid-term and longer-term goals include seek-
ing broad-spectrum products, which are products that are effective against
several biological agents.87 Following enactment of PAHPA, the BioShield
office (renamed to PHEMCE office) became the BARDA office and re-
leased the BARDA strategic plan, which aimed to facilitate the goals of the
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan and the PHEMCE Strategic Plan by improv-
ing advanced development for promising medical countermeasure candi-
dates.88 As mentioned above, although BARDA has been able to provide
some funds, their lack of appropriations have made implementing their stra-
tegic plan difficult.
V. HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES
The extensive increase in funding for biodefense research to study bio-
logical agents and create vaccines, therapeutics, and detection devices
against those agents have resulted in more researchers working on select
agents and in high-containment laboratories. High-containment laborato-
ries, which include biosafety level 3 and 4 (BSL3 or BSL4) laboratories in
83. Directive on Public Health and Medical Preparedness, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1364–1372 (Oct. 22, 2007).
84. BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEV. AUTH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES., PROJECT BIOSHIELD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: AUG. 2006–JULY 2007 58–59,
available at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/documents/bioshieldannualreport2006.pdf.
85. HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy for Chemi-
cal, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 13109, 13112–13 (Mar. 20,
2007).
86. The “one bug/one drug” concept means one medical intervention is developed for one
biological agent and sometimes only one variant of a biological agent.
87. An example of a broad-spectrum medical intervention is the antibiotic ciprofloxacin; a
combination vaccine that has components of several biological agents it can elicit a protective
immune response against those agents and is effective against different species of bacteria.
88. Biomedical Advanced Research and Dev. Auth. (BARDA), U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Hum. Services, Draft BARDA Strategic Plan for Medical Countermeasure Research, Develop-
ment, and Procurement (July 5, 2007), http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/documents/draftbardaplan.
pdf; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/phemce/enter-
prise/strategy/bardaplan.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
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the United States, are designed based on guidelines developed by the CDC
and NIH, the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL) manual.89 The BMBL is a biosafety document that provides guide-
lines for what agents and experiments should be followed in higher contain-
ment laboratories and what types of safety training personnel working in
those laboratories should receive. While the BMBL are guidelines, they
have been used as contractual requirements in grants and contracts for work
with agents requiring higher containment laboratories. High-containment
laboratories are used to protect laboratory workers and the outside environ-
ment from accidental exposure to the pathogens studied in those laborato-
ries; they are not a security facility as many from the traditional arms-
control community consider them to be. The highest containment laboratory
is BSL4, which houses the most dangerous pathogens, like Ebola virus, and
where personnel wear full body suits and use an external oxygen source.90
The level below is BSL3, in which many harmful pathogens that could be
aerosolized or are used in large quantities, like HIV, tuberculosis, and an-
thrax, are researched and require personnel to don gowns, masks, thicker
and/or more gloves, foot covers, and goggles. Many of the safety features in
the BMBL can serve biosecurity purposes by imposing physical protective
barriers between the laboratories and the outside community, including an-
terooms for wearing or removing personal equipment and restricted access.
Most high containment laboratories do not have armed guards but those that
do are mainly protecting the facility against violent animal-rights activists.
In recent years, the number of high-containment laboratories has sig-
nificantly increased.91 Following the anthrax mailings in 2001, NIAID built
two national BSL4 laboratories—Galveston National Laboratory and Na-
tional Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory—and several regional
BSL3 laboratories to complement the increased biodefense funding on vac-
cine, therapeutics, and detection and diagnostic devices against select
agents by NIAID, including the Research Centers of Excellence.92 All
BSL4 laboratories are registered with the CDC and/or APHIS because they
work on select agents. Those BSL3 laboratories that work on select agents
89. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATO-
RIES (5th ed. 2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/BMBL_5th_Edition.
pdf.
90. KAVITA MARFATIA BERGER ET AL., BIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAMS AS A COM-
PONENT OF PERSONNEL RELIABILITY: WORKSHOP REPORT 12 (2009), available at  http://
cstsp.aaas.org/files/AAAS%20Biosafety%20report.pdf.
91. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of
the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States: Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist Center for Technology and Engi-
neering Applied Research and Methods).
92. Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories: Meet-
ing Report and Center Recommendations, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 75, 77 (2007).
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are registered with the CDC and/or APHIS but those that do not work on
select agents are not. The proliferation of high-containment laboratories, the
unfounded fear that these labs provide unsupervised capability to malicious
actors, and/or the WMD Commission’s report recommending that oversight
should be reviewed93 have resulted in congressional hearings94 and bills95
as well as an executive order (EO 13,486)96 associated with improving
oversight of high-containment laboratories.
High-containment laboratories are also essential to protecting person-
nel working with select agents and harmful pathogens not on the select
agent list, like tuberculosis. There are very few BSL3 or BSL4 laboratories
that have no oversight system in place, whether federal, state, local, or in-
ternal. Private industry largely does not have many high containment labs;
there are no BSL4 labs in private industry in the United States, and the
majority of laboratories in industry (BSL2 or BSL3) are regulated by the
FDA for compliance with good laboratory practice and good manufacturing
practice because they produce products that will eventually enter human
consumption. Internal audits of research and laboratory capacity are rou-
tinely done in private industry as part of their business management prac-
tices. All materials from an abandoned research project are destroyed.
Research institutions and academia not only have internal inspections but
they are also inspected externally by a number of federal agencies whose
missions are based in environmental safety, worker protection, and security,
if applicable. Examples of external review bodies include DHS, CDC, DoD,
EPA, the Department of Transportation (DoT), the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), USDA, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA), NIH, and state departments of health.
Public health laboratories serve a more distinct function than research
oriented institutions. Nearly all public health facilities, including hospitals,
have a BSL3 laboratory or cabinets to mainly prevent accidental exposure
of the laboratory worker and environment from common disease-causing
agents, like tuberculosis. Since hospital and public health laboratories are at
the forefront of disease detection, they have to have the capabilities to han-
dle and detect known or unknown (novel) biological agents. In general, the
CDC, USDA, OSHA, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
93. COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, WORLD AT
RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TER-
RORISM (2008), available at http://www.preventwmd.gov/report.
94. Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007); Testimony on preventing weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and terrorism: Hearing Before H. Armed Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009), availa-
ble at http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information-jan-may2009.shtml.
95. Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act, H.R.1225, 111th Cong. (2009);
Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act, S. 485, 111th Cong. (2009).
96. Exec. Order No. 13,486; 74 Fed. Reg. 2289-2291(Jan. 9, 2009).
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(NIOSH), and EPA oversee the public health system.  Since all public
health laboratories work with clinical samples, they are all certified under
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) and subjected to
similar oversight as clinical research laboratories. All state public health
laboratories and some local laboratories are part of the CDC’s Laboratory
Response Network and are therefore overseen by the CDC. Hospital labora-
tories are accredited by the Joint Commission.97 Central to public health
preparedness and response are oversight of ready laboratories and personnel
to initially diagnose, identify, and research the disease-causing agent, and if
little or no medical interventions exist, develop vaccines and therapeutics
against the disease-causing agent.
VI. MICROBIAL FORENSICS
Attribution of a biological attack is very difficult to assess, as the 2001
anthrax attacks and accusation of Bruce Ivins demonstrate. While DNA
forensics has become well-established in the U.S. court system, many tech-
niques used to identify pathogens and their strains have not been. The field
of microbial forensics has blossomed since 2001. The anthrax attacks high-
lighted the differences between the public health community and law en-
forcement community on sample collection and investigations (i.e.
evaluation of exposed or infected individuals for medical and public health
purposes versus conducting a criminal investigation).98 Following the an-
thrax attacks, the FBI contacted well-known anthrax biologists to act as
subject-matter experts to help develop techniques to identify signatures in
the anthrax spores and/or evaluate the scientific data generated by these
techniques.99 The technologies used were cutting edge and developed as the
investigation evolved. However, the FBI interrogated these same scientists
as suspects, which has resulted in a very distrustful relationship between the
law enforcement and scientific communities.100
The public health community needs to be able to identify the infectious
agent to properly provide the appropriate therapeutics to the infected indi-
vidual(s) and conduct epidemiologic studies to determine who was exposed
97. The Joint Commission: Helping Health Care Organizations Help Patients, http://
www.jointcommission.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
98. Bruce Budowle et al., Building Microbial Forensics as a Response to Bioterrorism, 301
SCI. 1852 (2003); Jay C. Butler et al., Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforce-
ment: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response, 8 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1152, 1153–54 (2002).
99. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Biosecurity: Paul Keim on His Life with the FBI During the An-
thrax Investigation, 323 SCI. 1416 (2009); Yudhijit Bhattacharjee & Martin Enserink, Anthrax
Investigation: FBI Discusses Microbial Forensics—But Key Questions Remain Unanswered, 321
SCI. 1026 (2008).
100. Nathaniel Hafer, Cheryl J. Vos, Karen McAllister, Gretchen Lorenzi, Christopher Moore,
Kavita M. Berger & Michael Stebbins, How Scientists View Law Enforcement: New Survey of
Researchers Tells Us How to Help the Communities Communicate, SCI. PROGRESS, Feb. 2009, at
1.
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and what public health actions should be taken.101 Law enforcement has
different requirements. Law enforcement personnel need to be able to col-
lect samples and victim accounts that will hold up in a court of law and
conduct analyses to accurately determine the perpetrator. Since 2001, the
CDC and FBI as well as some state departments of public health and law
enforcement have developed plans for collecting and handling samples as
well as questioning victims.102 DHS has established the National Bioforen-
sic Analysis Center to conduct forensics analyses to identify the agent and
perpetrator of a biocrime or bioterrorist attack.103 Recently, the intelligence
community has been developing plans for microbial forensics, and the Na-
tional Research Council released the report Strengthening Forensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward, which addresses the science of foren-
sics in homeland security.104
VII. DECONTAMINATION
The question of “how clean is clean” stems from the public’s need for
no risk and the reality that no biological agent can be completely destroyed.
Following the contamination of the Senate Hart Building, the EPA was
called in to clean up the building and Senate staff wanted to know when it
was safe to return to the building.105 Anthrax spores are hardy and common
procedures like bleach treatment or heat will not destroy them, but as the
decontamination efforts of the Senate Hart Office Building demonstrated,
chlorine dioxide gas can be used as a decontamination agent against an-
thrax. There is a risk that the spore could germinate and grow to dangerous
levels. There are now documented actions for decontaminating infrastruc-
ture if contaminated with the United States’ highest priority threat agents.
Only recently has the issue of decontamination and how infrastructure,
goods, and people can safely and effectively be decontaminated been
considered.
101. Steven E. Schutzer et al., Biocrimes, Microbial Forensics, and the Physician, 2 PLOS
MED. 1242, (2005), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.
pmed.0020337.
102. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Health and
Human Services & Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidance on Initial Responses to
a Suspicious Letter/Container with a Potential Biological Threat, Nov. 2, 2004, http://
www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/pdf/suspicious-package-biothreat.pdf.
103. Department of Homeland Security, National Biodefense Analysis Countermeasure
Center, http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1166211221830.shtm (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
104. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FOREN-
SIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
105. Steve Ritter, Hart Senate Office Building Decontaminated, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at 13.
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VIII. SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
This paper has presented the many areas in which science plays a role
in bioterrorism preparedness and response. Scientists may be asked to help
in identifying infectious agents, developing medical countermeasures, or at-
tributing a bioterrorism incident to a suspect. Modern history has demon-
strated that scientists have acted responsibly and stepped up to the
challenges they face. This section briefly documents major actions by scien-
tists in international security and biosafety.
Scientists have played a critical role in national security since the days
of the Manhattan Project and atomic bomb. In 1939, Leo Szilard, a Hun-
garian-American physicist, convinced Albert Einstein to sign a letter
describing advancement in nuclear physics—in particular, their military ap-
plication—to President Roosevelt.106 This effectively started the Manhattan
Project. The fear that Nazi Germany was developing their own nuclear
bombs drove scientists to support the United States developing equal arse-
nal to counteract Germany’s potential capability. Following the defeat of
Germany, many of the same scientists working on the atomic bomb signed
a petition, authored by Szilard, stating that the threat of nuclear bombs no
longer existed and that unless absolutely necessary, nuclear bombs should
not be used against Japan.107 Following the end of World War II, physicists
were intimately involved in reviewing the societal consequences of nuclear
weapons and shaping nuclear weapons policy. Notable activities in which
scientists played a major role include establishment of the Pugwash Confer-
ences108 and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,109 the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,110 and a series of test ban treaties, the
latest being the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.111 At international confer-
ences, American and Soviet physicists engaged in scientific discussions that
contributed to the disclosure or perception of United States and Soviet nu-
clear capabilities. These revelations, then, informed U.S. and Soviet leader-
ship about nuclear weapons advancements and fueled the policies of
deterrence. Throughout this Cold War period, groups like the JASON De-
fense Advisory Group (an independent group of accomplished scientists)112
106. Letter from Albert Einstein to Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President (Aug. 2, 1939) (on
file with author), available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/einstein_letter_photo-
graph.htm.
107. Petition from Leo Szilard and 69 co-signers to Harry S. Truman, U.S. President (July 17,
1945) (on file with author), available at http://www.dannen.com/decision/45-07-17.html.
108. Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, http://www.pugwash.org/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
109. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/ (last visited Aug. 24,
2009).
110. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 169.
111. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sep. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439, available at http://
www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.tt.html.
112. JASON Defense Advisory Group, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ (last visited
Aug. 24, 2009).
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and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security
and Arms Control113 addressed key science and security issues and were
vehicles for policy development or international engagement.
While much of the Cold War era was spent deterring the nuclear arms
race, the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) was present.
However, scientists seemed to have been less engaged in policy discussions
regarding CBW than their physicist counterparts. While the major world
powers had active CBW programs following World War II, the urgency
with which to consider the societal implications of this research (as was the
case with the atomic bomb) may not have existed, since the use of CBW
was banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.114 In 1969, President Nixon en-
ded the U.S. bioweapons program115 and initiated international discussions
on a treaty banning the development and stockpiling in types and quantities
of biological substances intended to do harm; the Biological Weapons Con-
vention (BWC) was signed in 1972.116 The two notable biologists who were
very active in policy discussions regarding biological weapons were Joshua
Lederberg and Matthew Meselson. After the fall of the Soviet Union and
revelation of an enormous and covert Soviet bioweapons research complex,
the international community, with input from the academic scientific com-
munity (not the biotechnology or pharmaceutical industry), began negotiat-
ing a verification protocol for the BWC.117 In 1993, the Chemical Weapons
Convention was successfully negotiated and contained within it a verifica-
tion protocol. The chemical industry was integral to the success of the CWC
negotiations and scientists rallied to persuade the United States ratify the
treaty before it went into force in 1997.118 This offered hope to those seek-
ing a verification protocol for the BWC, but after seven years of negotia-
tion, the protocol failed.119
Although not directly related to biological weapons, the U.S. scientific
community called for a moratorium in the 1970s on the newly emerging
113. National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control,
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cisac/About_CISAC.html, (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
114. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/626de49e3227d3
6dc125641e003a172a.
115. Christopher J. Davis, Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Pro-
grams of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 509, 509 (1999).
116. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bateriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/text/bwc.htm.
117. Raymond A. Zilinskas, Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention, 24 CRITICAL REV. MICROBIOLOGY 195, 195 (1998).
118. Letter from 148 Prominent Scientists to Trent Lott, U.S. Senator (Feb. 24, 1997) (on file
with author), available at http://fas.org/blog/cw/document-archive/documents-by-type/letters-
from-prominent-scienti.
119. Jonathan Tucker, The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Compliance Protocol, NU-
CLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (2001), http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_2a.html.
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recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology until its risks (including its potential
to be misused for malicious purposes) could be assessed and guidelines
were formed regarding its safe use.120 Preeminent American scientists, gov-
ernment officials and journalists discussed the risks and potential guidelines
at the 1975 Asilomar Conference.121  Institutional Biosafety Committees
(IBC) were created as a result of these discussions to oversee rDNA re-
search. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the biosecurity community has be-
come increasingly concerned about the misuse of legitimate research by
individuals with malicious intent. Throughout the world, scientists have
been involved in policy discussions about oversight and education of dual-
use research; the U.S. government has created the NSABB to provide rec-
ommendations to the U.S. government on oversight and education of dual-
use research. Current recommendations include biosecurity review by the
IBC and biosafety officers, as well as vetting laboratory personnel seeking
to work in high-containment labs. Most recently, biosafety and biosecurity
have been used interchangeably; there are ongoing biosecurity policy dis-
cussions about oversight of high-containment laboratories and biosafety
training.
IX. CONCLUSION
The discovery of the extensive Soviet bioweapons program, the unsuc-
cessful Aum Shinrikyo bioweapons program, acquisition of dangerous bio-
logical agents by a member of the Aryan Nations, the events of September
and October 2001, the West Nile outbreak, and the SARS outbreak have
contributed to the current state of preparedness and response to biological
threats—whether natural, accidental, or intentional. Unlike other forms of
weapons of mass destruction, biological agents are readily found in nature
and nearly all cause natural disease outbreaks throughout the world. Poli-
cies to prevent a bioterrorist incident may impair scientists’ ability to re-
spond to the incident. Science plays a major role in preventing and
mitigating a bioterrorist attack. A careful analysis of the impact of the
United States’ security policies on national security and scientific advance-
ment and public health, as well as fostering a trusting relationship between
the security and scientific communities, are sorely needed to effectively
prepare for the next biological incident.
120. Paul Berg, Meetings that Changed the World: Asilomar 1975: DNA Modification Se-
cured, 455 NATURE 290, 290 (2008).
121. Paul Berg et al., Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 1981 (1975).
